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Over the last 20 years, with the development of the Common European Asylum System, the policymaking 
towards asylum seekers has transposed to the European Union. EU’s ambition though to build a harmonized 
asylum system differs from reality and the injustices among Member States led to the deep crisis of the 
Dublin Regulation. This policy brief, examines the process of the Dublin Regulation, the problems that are 
still being confronted and the legislative framework of the regulation. The paper concludes with the proposal 
of recommendations and perspectives that could lead to a deeper integration of the system. 
Keywords: Dublin Regulation; Immigration Policy of EU; European Union; Common European Asylum 
System; Asylum seekers. 
 
Introduction 
It is undeniable that the Dublin Regulation is a very complex subject which includes a plethora of 
major parameters such as fairness among the Member States of European Union (EU), fundamental 
human and refugees’ rights and of course the effectiveness of the Regulation.  
The Dublin Regulation practically, evaluates the responsible Member State for the assessment of 
individual asylum applications within the EU according to the so – called Dublin criteria. In order to 
understand the conditions and the reasons that led to the Dublin Regulations, it is legitimate to lay 
down the framework of the European Union’s immigration policy within which they were created. 
(Brouwer, 2013) 
Until the beginning of 1980’s, the formation of a Common European Asylum System was not a 
priority and remained in the third pillar: Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). This changed drastically 
with the increase in the number of applicants due to international developments and setbacks 
(conflicts in the European continent and difficult political situations in countries outside Europe) 
which created the need to coordinate the national asylum policies of the Member States of the 
Community and the existence of a common strategy. 
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Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
Briefly referring to the formulation of the European immigration policy, we can identify two 
milestones. The Schengen Agreement refers to an extra-EC initiative between five European 
Community countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) to control the 
Union's external borders and free movement of Member States' citizens in the Single European Area. 
The creation of such an area would not have been possible without the simultaneous regulation of 
immigration and asylum issues. It also introduced the first pan-European police database, the 
Schengen Information System (SIS). In addition, the Single European Act in 1987, created the 
Common Market, a Community area with free movement of people, goods, services and capital 
(Brekke, 2014). 
On 15 of June 1990, the Dublin Convention was signed and it was the first binding treaty in the field 
of asylum. It was a transnational and not a Community creation. It was intended to regulate the EU 
Member State which was each time responsible for examining an asylum application in order to deal 
with the abuses by the applicants, but also in order to tackle the inaction of the states invoking their 
incompetence. The fundamental premise of the convention was that all contracting States were 
considered safe countries and therefore the determination on a basis of objective criteria, against the 
personal wish of the applicant, would not infringe their rights (Velluti, 2014). 
The step forward came with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), when asylum and immigration policy 
came under the first pillar and part of the Member State’s jurisdiction was transferred to the Union. 
At the same time, an area of "freedom, security and justice" was established, in which " In order to 
establish progressively an area of freedom, security and justice, the Council shall adopt: (a) within 
a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, measures aimed at 
ensuring the free movement of persons in accordance with Article 7a, in conjunction with directly 
related flanking measures with respect to external border controls, asylum and immigration, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 73j(2) and (3) and Article 73k(l)(a) and (2)(a), and 
measures to prevent and combat crime in accordance with the provisions of Article K.3(e) of the 
Treaty on European Union" (Treaty of Amsterdam, article 2). 
The Dublin II Regulation (343/2003 / EC) was adopted in February 2003 to implement Article 63 
TEC, which required the Dublin Convention to be replaced by a Community legal act. It has been 
implemented by all EU Member States, as well as by Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. 
This Regulation, which is considered to be the first cornerstone of CEAS, was based on the principle 
of causality. At the same time, the Eurodac database established an administrative fingerprint 
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database. It thus set the criteria for determining which Member State would be responsible for the 
asylum procedure. 
The criteria were as follow3: Principle of family unity, insurance of residence permits or visas, illegal 
entry or stay in a Member State, legal entry in a Member State, application in an international transit 
area of an airport (Fullerton, 2016). 
The crisis of Dublin Regulation 
The Dublin II Regulation did not constitute a quota system for the distribution of asylum applications 
in all EU Member States but transferred almost the entire burden of management to the countries 
located at the Union's external borders. The point of the Rules of Procedure, which has largely created 
the present crisis and is a constant field of tension between States, is the criterion of the applicant's 
illegal entry and residence to determine the State responsible for examining the asylum application. 
The industrialized countries of Northern and Central Europe, have long been the preferred destination 
for asylum seekers, since, for the period 2000-2004 (the time of enactment of the Dublin II 
Regulation), four countries of the European Union (United Kingdom, France, Germany and Austria) 
received two thirds of asylum applications worldwide each year (Eurostat, 2009). The desire of these 
countries to reduce the flows to their territories and to combat asylum shopping in conjunction with 
their political displacement in the Union led to the adoption of this criterion. Therefore, with the 
exception of family reunification and the liability of a state for the legal residence and entry of a third-
country national -an extremely limited case- , the liability falls on countries of illegal entry which are 
not other than regional countries such as Greece, Italy, Malta and Cyprus. These states followed a 
relatively relaxed fingerprinting process, facilitating the transition to the North (Hatton, 2009). 
Dublin III Regulation 
The above weaknesses of the Regulation, problems related both to the effectiveness of the system 
and the level of protection of the rights of asylum seekers were recognized by the Commission, which 
in 2008 submitted a proposal for the reform of the Dublin II Regulation. The Commission proposal, 
was intend to increase the efficiency of the system and to ensure higher standards of protection for 
persons covered by the procedure, while at the same time addressing the particular pressures of 
reception facilities and asylum systems in the Member States. The most interesting point of the 
 
3 The criteria are to be applied in the order in which they are presented in the Regulation and on the basis of the situation 
existing when the asylum seeker first lodged his/her application with a Member State (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al33153). 
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Commission’s Proposal was the introduction of a new procedure in the Regulation allowing the 
temporary suspension of transfers to the responsible Member State, in cases where a State is facing a 
" particularly urgent situation which puts a great deal of pressure on the reception capacity, its 
asylum system or infrastructure" (Preamble, para. 21) or when the Commission considers that the 
level of protection of applicants for international protection in a particular Member State does not 
comply with Community asylum law, in particular as regards the access to the asylum procedure, in 
order to ensure that all applicants for international protection enjoy an adequate level of protection in 
all Member States (Preamble, para. 22). 
This proposal was justified in terms of solidarity for those Member States which, due to their 
geographical location, face intensive pressures. However, it was not adopted in the revised Regulation 
604/2013/ EU, because as the Commission acknowledged, the consultation process showed that the 
majority of Member States were in favor of maintaining the fundamental principles of the Regulation. 
The compromise solution was the introduction of the Early Warning Mechanism (Regulation 
604/2013 / EU, Article 33). 
As is clear from the above provision, the Regulation once again does not overturn either the criteria 
for determining the responsible Member State or their hierarchy.  
Some of the notable changes are that the scope of asylum is expanded to include beneficiaries of 
international protection and stateless persons, while the concept of "international protection" is 
expanded to add asylum seekers and subsidiary protection applicants. It also establishes the right to 
inform applicants in a language they understand about the current legal framework on asylum in the 
EU and the implementation of the Dublin III Regulation and provide a personal interview in order to 
facilitate the process of identifying the responsible Member State, and in any case before the transfer 
decision is taken (European Commission, 2015). 
Towards a reform of the CEAS: Dublin IV Regulation Proposal 
In May 2016, the Commission once again seeks to reform the CEAS by submitting a proposal to the 
European Parliament and the Council (European Commission, 2016). Its objectives can be 
summarized as follows: (a) establishing a viable and equitable system for allocating asylum 
applications by providing a permanent allocation mechanism within the Dublin Regulation based on 
the logic of relocation; (b) preventing secondary movements through the greater harmonization of 
asylum systems and the imposition of sanctions on those making secondary travel, (c) facilitating 
return and combating irregular migration through the strengthening of the Eurodac system and (d) 
upgrading the role of EASO.  
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Even though earlier that year EU Commissioner for migration Dimitris Avramopoulos had announced 
that the revamp would be based on a distribution key system and he told MEPs in the civil liberties 
committee that "Dublin should not be any more just a mechanism to allocate responsibility […]  it 
needs to be a solidarity instrument among member states", Commission chose in the submitted 
proposal to "streamline" the current system and supplemente it with a correctional mechanism of 
equal treatment (Nielsen, 2016). 
In particular, it was proposed to introduce an allocation correction mechanism, which will work as 
follows: an automated system will record all applications for international protection and will 
continuously monitor the percentage of applications for each designated responsible Member State 
compared to a set key reference rate.  Whenever the number of applications for which a Member State 
is responsible exceeds 150% of the number specified in the reference key, the mechanism will be 
activated automatically, resulting all new applications submitted to the disproportionately pressured 
Member State to be transferred to another Member State with a number of applications less than the 
number specified in the reference key. 
Additionally, the criteria for determining the Member State responsible for examining the asylum 
application remain the same and some new obligations are added to them. The application for 
international protection must be submitted to the Member State of first irregular entry, where the 
applicant must remain until the procedure is completed and the applicant has an obligation to check 
whether the application is inadmissible, in case the applicant comes from a first country of asylum or 
from a safe third country, in which case the applicant will be returned to the third country and the 
admissions authority will be Member State. Finally, a proposal was adopted to abolish the disclaimer 
clause 12 months after the irregular entry, while the discretion clause is made less extensive, to ensure 
that it is used only for humanitarian purposes for the extended family (European Parliament, Policy 
Department, 2016). 
The above proposals for the new Dublin Regulation provoked a strong wave of reactions, especially 
from the countries of first entry, which hoped for a substantial and tangible rationalization of the 
asylum system. The new regulations are obviously moving in the opposite direction from the one 
announced by the Commission. Not only do they not facilitate these states, but new obligations are 
introduced for them. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
From the formation of the asylum system, it was clear that the division of responsibility between the 
Member States would not be done in a harmonizes and meritocratic way with the states on the 
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southern and eastern borders of the Union bearing the brunt of managing the refugee issue since the 
criterion of illegal entry was the dominant criterion for determining the responsible state. The inherent 
imbalances of the Dublin system were exacerbated by the pathogenesis of the asylum and host 
systems of the periphery of the European Union, which began to come under increasing pressure from 
mixed migratory flows. 
From the examination of the way that EU handled the refugee crisis, two main findings emerge: 
• The policies pursued are largely incompatible with international and EU law. 
• Effective management of those entering European territory is not achieved, in terms of an equal 
distribution of responsibilities between the Member States and, in that regard, an equal burden on 
their asylum and reception systems, in fulfillment of the principle of solidarity in Article 80 TFEU. 
Member States have engaged in a "zero-sum game", developing a more defensive than cooperative 
attitude, based on the lack of mutual trust. The European Parliament's proposal could launch a new 
dialogue within the EU. Clearly, a radical overhaul of the Dublin Regulation is a key precondition 
for managing the refugee issue and dealing with the crisis: 
• The construction of a substantially CEAS, which will harmonize the standards of protection and social 
inclusion of applicants for international protection and refugees from all Member States is needed. 
• The European Parliament should support the use of distribution keys, based on a rigorous assessment 
of the extent to which States are meeting their obligations. 
• To cope with imbalances caused or exacerbated by significant numbers of arrivals and limited 
capacity, Asylum Migration and International Fund resources for emergency measures should be 
increased in future budgets to ensure that adequate resources can be quickly made available to deal 
with conditions of heavy migratory flows as prescribed in the provisions of the AMIF Regulation. 
• The European Parliament should ensure future legislation avoids coercion. 
• A comprehensive reform of the EU immigration policy - whose extremely restrictive logic has led to 
an overburdening of asylum systems - also needs to be reconsidered. 
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